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Abstract
By resorting to the vector space structure of finite games, skew-symmetric games
(SSGs) are proposed and investigated as a natural subspace of finite games. First
of all, for two player games, it is shown that the skew-symmetric games form
an orthogonal complement of the symmetric games. Then for a general SSG its
linear representation is given, which can be used to verify whether a finite game
is skew-symmetric. Furthermore, some properties of SSGs are also obtained in
the light of its vector subspace structure. Finally, a symmetry-based decompo-
sition of finite games is proposed, which consists of three mutually orthogonal
subspaces: symmetric subspace, skew-symmetric subspace and asymmetric sub-
space. An illustrative example is presented to demonstrate this decomposition.
Keywords: Symmetric game, skew-symmetric game, linear representation,
symmetric group, decomposition, semi-tensor product of matrices
1. Introduction
The vector space structure of finite games is firstly proposed by [3]. Then
it has been merged as an isomorphism onto a finite Euclidean space [8]. As a
result, the decomposition of the vector space of finite games becomes a natu-
ral and interesting topic. Since the potential game is theoretically important
and practically useful, a decomposition based on potential games and harmonic
games has been investigated [3, 8]. Symmetric game is another kind of inter-
esting games [1], which may provide useful properties for applications. Hence
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symmetry-based decomposition is another interesting topic. Decomposition may
help to classify games and to reveal properties of each kind of finite games.
To provide a clear picture of the decompositions we first give a survey for
the vector space structure of finite games.
Definition 1. A (normal form non-cooperative) finite game G = (N,S,C) con-
sists of three ingredients:
(i) Player, N = {1, 2, · · · , n}: which means there are n players;
(ii) Profile, S =
∏n
i=1 Si: where Si = {1, · · · , ki} is the set of strategies (ac-
tions) of player i;
(iii) Payoff, C = {c1, c2, · · · , cn}: where ci : S → R is the payoff function of
player i.
Assume j ∈ Si, i.e., j is the j-th strategy of player i. Instead of j, we denote
this strategy by δjki , which is the j-th column of identity matrix Iki . This
expression is called the vector form of strategies. Since each payoff function
ci is a pseudo-logical function, there is a unique row vector V
c
i ∈ R
k, where
k =
∏n
i=1 ki, such that (when the vector form is adopted) the payoffs can be
expressed as
ci(x1, · · · , xn) = V
c
i ⋉
n
j=1 xj , i = 1, · · · , n, (1)
where ⋉ is the semi-tensor product of matrices which is defined in next section.
The set of finite games G = (N,S,C) with |N | = n, |Si| = ki, i = 1, · · · , n, is
denoted by G[n;k1,··· ,kn]. Now it is clear that a game G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is uniquely
determined by
VG := [V
c
1 , V
c
2 , · · · , V
c
n ] , (2)
which is called the structure vector of G. Hence G[n;k1,··· ,kn] has a natural vector
space structure as Rnk.
The potential-based decomposition of finite games was firstly proposed by
Candogan and Menache, using the knowledge of algebraic topology and the
Helmholtz decomposition theory from graph theory [3]. The decomposition is
shown in (3), where P , N , andH are pure potential games, non-strategic games,
and pure harmonic games respectively. Unfortunately, the inner product used
there is not the standard one in Rnk.
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] = ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential games
P ⊕
Harmonic games︷ ︸︸ ︷
N ⊕ H . (3)
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The vector space structure of potential games has been clearly revealed in [7]
by providing a basis of potential subspace. Using this result, [8] re-obtained the
decomposition (3) with Rnk standard inner product through a straightforward
linear algebraic computation.
The concept of symmetric game was firstly proposed by Nash [13]. It be-
comes an important topic since then [1, 2, 4]. We also refer to [10] for a vector
space approach to symmetric games. The symmetry-based decompositions have
been discussed recently as for four strategy matrix games [15], as well as for gen-
eral two-player games [16].
In this paper, the skew-symmetric game is proposed. First, we show that
two-player games have an orthogonal decomposition as in (4). That is, the
vector subspace of skew-symmetric games is the orthogonal complement of the
subspace of symmetric games:
G[2;κ] = S[2;κ] ⊕K[2;κ], (4)
where G[2;κ] = G[2;κ,κ], S[2;κ] and K[2;κ] are symmetric and skew-symmetric sub-
spaces of G[2;κ] respectively.
Furthermore, certain properties of skew-symmetric games are also revealed.
The bases of symmetric and skew-symmetric games are constructed. Due to
their orthogonality, following conclusions about the decomposition of finite games
G[n,κ] are obtained:
(1) if n > κ+ 1, then
G[n;κ] = S[n;κ] ⊕ E[n;κ]; (5)
(2) if n ≤ κ+ 1, then
G[n;κ] = S[n;κ] ⊕K[n;κ] ⊕ E[n;κ], (6)
where E[n;κ] is the set of asymmetric games.
Finally, for statement ease, we give some notations:
1. Mm×n: the set of m× n real matrices.
2. Bm×n: the set of m × n Boolean matrices, (Bn: the set of n dimensional
Boolean vectors.)
3. Col(M) (Row(M)): the set of columns (rows) ofM . Coli(M) (Rowi(M)):
the i-th column (row) of M .
4. D := {0, 1}.
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5. δin: the i-th column of the identity matrix In.
6. ∆n :=
{
δin|i = 1, · · · , n
}
.
7. 1ℓ = (1, 1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ℓ
)T .
8. 0p×q: a p× q matrix with zero entries.
9. A matrix L ∈ Mm×n is called a logical matrix if the columns of L are of
the form δkm. That is, Col(L) ⊂ ∆m. Denote by Lm×n the set of m × n
logical matrices.
10. If L ∈ Ln×r, by definition it can be expressed as L = [δi1n , δ
i2
n , · · · , δ
ir
n ].
For the sake of compactness, it is briefly denoted as L = δn[i1, i2, · · · , ir].
11. Sn: n-th order symmetric group.
12. 〈·, ·〉: the standard inner product in Rn.
13. Pn: n-th order Boolean orthogonal group.
14. GL(n,R) (or GL(V )): general linear group.
15. G[n;k1,··· ,kn]: the set of finite games with |N | = n, |Si| = ki.
16. G[n;κ]: |Si| = κ, i = 1, · · · , n.
17. S[n;κ]: the set of (ordinary) symmetric games. Denote by GS a symmetric
game.
18. K[n;κ]: the set of skew-symmetric games. Denote by GK a skew-symmetric
game.
19. E[n;κ]: the set of asymmetric games. Denote by GE an asymmetric game.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, a brief review of
semi-tensor product of matrices is given. After introducing a symmetry-based
classification of finite games, Section 3 presents mainly two results: (1) the
orthogonal decomposition of two player games; (2) the linear representation of
skew-symmetric games. Some properties of skew-symmetric games are discussed
in Section 4. A basis of K[n,κ] is also constructed. Section 5 is devoted to
verifying the orthogonality of symmetric and skew-symmetric games. Section 6
provides a symmetry-based orthogonal decomposition of finite games. In Section
7, an illustrative example is given to demonstrate this decomposition. Section
8 is a brief conclusion.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Semi-tensor Product of Matrices
In this section, we give a brief survey on semi-tensor product (STP) of ma-
trices. It is the main tool for our approach. We refer to [5, 6] for details. The
STP of matrices is defined as follows:
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Definition 2. Let M ∈ Mm×n, N ∈Mp×q. The STP of M and N is defined
as
M ⋉N :=
(
M ⊗ It/n
) (
N ⊗ It/p
)
∈ Mmt/n×qt/p, (7)
where t = lcm(n, p) is the least common multiple of n and p, and ⊗ is the
Kronecker product.
STP is a generalization of conventional matrix product, and all computa-
tional properties of the conventional matrix product remain available. It has
been successfully used for studying logical (control) systems [12, 18]. Through-
out this paper, the default matrix product is STP. Hence, the product of two
arbitrary matrices is well defined, and the symbol ⋉ is mostly omitted.
First, we give some basic properties of STP, which will be used in the sequel.
Proposition 3. 1. (Associative Law:)
A⋉ (B ⋉ C) = (A⋉B)⋉ C. (8)
2. (Distributive Law:)
(A+ B)⋉ C = A⋉ C +B ⋉ C; (9)
C ⋉ (A+B) = C ⋉A+ C ⋉B. (10)
Proposition 4. Let X ∈ Rt be a t dimensional column vector, andM a matrix.
Then
X ⋉M = (It ⊗M)⋉X. (11)
Definition 5. A swap matrix W[m,n] ∈Mmn×mn is defined as
W[m,n] := [δ
1
nδ
1
m, · · · , δ
n
nδ
1
m; δ
1
nδ
2
m, · · · , δ
n
nδ
2
m, · · · , δ
1
nδ
m
m , · · · , δ
n
nδ
m
m ]. (12)
The basic function of a swap matrix is to swap two vectors.
Proposition 6. Let X ∈ Rm and Y ∈ Rn be two column vectors. Then
W[m,n]XY = Y X. (13)
5
The swap matrix is an orthogonal matrix:
Proposition 7. W[m,n] is an orthogonal matrix. Precisely,
W−1[m,n] =W
T
[m,n] =W[n,m]. (14)
Given a matrix A = (ai,j) ∈Mm×n, its row stacking form is
VR(A) := (a11, a12, · · · , a1n; · · · ; am1, am2, · · · , amn)
T
;
its column stacking form is
VC(A) := (a11, a21, · · · , am1; · · · ; a1n, a2n, · · · , amn)
T
.
Using Propositions 6 and 7 yields
Proposition 8. Given a matrix A = (ai,j) ∈Mm×n. Then
VR(A) =W[m,n]VC(A); VC(A) =W[n,m]VR(A); (15)
and
VR(A
T ) = VC(A); VC(A
T ) = VR(A). (16)
Next, we consider the matrix expression of logical relations. Identifying
1 ∼ δ12 , 0 ∼ δ
2
2 ,
then a logical variable x ∈ D can be expressed in vector form as
x ∼
(
x
1− x
)
,
which is called the vector form expression of x.
A mapping f : Dn → R is called a pseudo-Boolean function.
Proposition 9. Given a pseudo-Boolean function f : Dn → R, there exists a
unique row vector Vf ∈ R2
n
, called the structure vector of f , such that (in vector
form)
f(x1, · · · , xn) = Vf ⋉
n
i=1 xi. (17)
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Remark 10. In previous proposition, if D is replaced by Dκ, κ > 2, then the
function f is called a pseudo-logical function and the expression (17) remains
available with an obvious modification that xi ∈ ∆κ and Vf ∈ Rκ
n
.
Definition 11. Let A ∈ Mp×n and B ∈ Mq×n. Then the Khatri-Rao product
of A and B, denoted by A ∗B, is defined as follows:
A ∗B = [Col1(A)⋉ Col1(B),Col2(A)⋉ Col2(B), · · · ,Coln(A)⋉ Coln(B)] ∈Mpq×n.
Proposition 12. Assume
u =M ⋉ni=1 xi ∈ ∆p, v = N ⋉
n
i=1 xi ∈ ∆q,
where xi ∈ ∆ki , i = 1, 2, · · · , n; M ∈ Lp×k, N ∈ Lq×k, k =
∏n
i=1 ki. Then
uv = (M ∗N)⋉ni=1 xi ∈ ∆pq.
3. Symmetric and Skew-symmetric Games
3.1. Classification of Finite Games
This subsection considers the symmetry-based classification of finite games.
First, we give a rigorous definition for symmetric and skew-symmetric games.
Definition 13. Let G = (N,S,C) ∈ G[n;κ].
1. If for any σ ∈ Sn, we have
ci(x1, · · · , xn) = cσ(i)(xσ−1(1), xσ−1(2), · · · , xσ−1(n)), (18)
where i = 1, · · · , n, then G is called a symmetric game. Denote by S[n;κ]
the set of symmetric games in G[n;κ].
2. If for any σ ∈ Sn, we have
ci(x1, · · · , xn) = sign(σ)cσ(i)(xσ−1(1), xσ−1(2) · · · , xσ−1(n)), (19)
where i = 1, · · · , n, then G is called a skew-symmetric game. Denote by
K[n;κ] the set of skew-symmetric games in G[n;κ].
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It is well known that G[n;κ] ∼ R
nκn is a vector space [3, 8]. It is easy to
figure out that both S[n;κ] and K[n;κ] are subspaces of G[n;κ]. Hence, they are
also two subspaces of Rnκ
n
.
Then, we can define the following asymmetric subspace.
Definition 14. G is called an asymmetric game if its structure vector
VG ∈
[
S[n;κ]
⋃
K[n;κ]
]⊥
. (20)
The set of asymmetric games is denoted by E[n;κ], which is also a subspace of
R
nκn.
Example 15. Consider G ∈ G[3;2]. A straightforward computation shows the
following result:
(1) If G ∈ S[3;2], then its payoff functions are as in Table 1, where [a, b, c, d, e, f ]
T ∈
R
6.
(2) If G ∈ K[3;2], then its payoff functions are as in Table 2, where [g, h]
T ∈ R2.
(3) If G ∈ E[3;2], then its payoff functions are as in Table 3, where [ξ1, · · · , ξ16]
T ∈
R
16 and γ1 = −ξ1 − ξ9, γ2 = −ξ5 − ξ11, γ3 = −ξ2 − ξ13, γ4 = −ξ6 −
ξ15, γ5 = −ξ3 − ξ10, γ6 = −ξ7 − ξ12, γ7 = −ξ4 − ξ14, γ8 = −ξ8 − ξ16.
It follows that dim(VS[3,2]) = 6, dim(VK[3,2]) = 2, and dim(VE[3,2]) = 16.
Moreover, it is ready to verify the orthogonality:
VS[3,2]V
T
K[3,2]
= 0,
VE[3,2]V
T
S[3,2]
= 0,
VE[3,2]V
T
K[3,2]
= 0.
We conclude that
G[3,2] = S[3,2] ⊕K[3,2] ⊕ E[3,2],
which verifies (6).
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Table 1: Payoff matrix of a symmetric game in S[3;2]:
c\a 111 112 121 122 211 212 221 222
c1 a b b d c e e f
c2 a b c e b d e f
c3 a c b e b e d f
Table 2: Payoff matrix of a skew-symmetric game in K[3;2]:
c\s 111 112 121 122 211 212 221 222
c1 0 g -g 0 0 h -h 0
c2 0 -g 0 -h g 0 h 0
c3 0 0 g h -g -h 0 0
Table 3: Payoff matrix of an asymmetric game in E[3;2]:
c\s 111 112 121 122 211 212 221 222
c1 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8
c2 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6 ξ7 ξ8
c3 ξ9 ξ10 ξ11 ξ12 ξ13 ξ14 ξ15 ξ16
3.2. Two Player Games
In this subsection we consider G ∈ G[2;κ]. Let A and B be the payoff matrices
of player 1 and player 2 respectively. According to Definition 13, it is easy to
verify the following fact:
Lemma 16. 1. G is a symmetric game, if and only if,
A = BT .
2. G is a skew-symmetric game, if and only if,
A = −BT .
Note that for G ∈ G[2;κ], we have its structure vector as
VG = [V
T
R (A), V
T
R (B)],
where VR(A(B)) is the row stacking form of matrix A(B).
According to Propositions 7 and 8, we have the following result:
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Lemma 17. 1. G is a symmetric game, if and only if,
VG =
[
V c1 , V
c
1 W[κ,κ]
]
. (21)
2. G is a skew-symmetric game, if and only if,
VG =
[
V c1 ,−V
c
1W[κ,κ]
]
. (22)
According to Lemma 17, the following result can be obtained via a straight-
forward computation.
Theorem 18. Let G ∈ G[2;κ]. Then G can be orthogonally decomposed to
G = GS ⊕GK , (23)
where GS ∈ S[2;κ] and GK ∈ K[2;κ].
Proof. Denote the structure vector of G as VG = [V
c
1 , V
c
2 ]. We construct a
symmetric game GS by setting
VGS = [S, SW[κ,κ]];
and a skew-symmetric game GK by
VGK = [K,−KW[κ,κ]],
where
S =
V c1 + V
c
2W[κ,κ]
2
; K =
V c1 − V
c
2 W[κ,κ]
2
.
Then, it is ready to verify that
(i) VG = VGS + VGK ;
(ii) 〈VGS , VGK 〉 = 0.
The conclusion follows. ✷
Note that Theorem 18 implies the decomposition (4).
Example 19. Consider G ∈ G[2;2].
(1) G is symmetric, if and only if, its payoff functions are as in Table 4.
(2) G is skew-symmetric, if and only if, its payoff functions are as in Table 5.
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(3) Let G ∈ G[2;2] with its payoff bi-matrix as in Table 6.
Then it has an orthogonal decomposition into GS and GK with their payoff
bi-matrices as in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively with
a = α+β2 , b =
γ+η
2 , c =
ξ+δ
2
λ+µ
2 ;
a′ = α−β2 , b
′ = γ−η2 , c
′ = ξ−δ2
λ−µ
2 .
Table 4: Payoff bi-matrix of a symmetric game in G[2;2]
P1\P2 1 2
1 a, a b, c
2 c, b d, d
Table 5: Payoff bi-matrix of a skew-symmetric game in G[2;2]
P1\P2 1 2
1 a’, -a’ b’, -c’
2 c’, -b’ d’, -d’
Table 6: Payoff bi-matrix of a game in G[2;2]
P1\P2 1 2
1 α, β γ, δ
2 ξ, η λ, µ
3.3. Skew-Symmetric Game and Its Linear Representation
First, we present a necessary condition for verifying skew-symmetric games.
Proposition 20. Consider G ∈ G[n;κ]. If G ∈ K[n;κ], then
V ci = −V
c
1W[κi−2,κ]W[κ,κi−1], i = 2, · · · , n. (24)
Proof. Consider σ = (1, i). According to Definition 13, we have
cσ(1)(xσ−1(1), · · · , xσ−1(n)) = −c1(x1, · · · , xn).
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That is,
V ci xix2 · · ·xi−1x1xi+1 · · ·xn
= V ci W[κi−1,κ]x2 · · ·xi−1x1xixi+1 · · ·xn
= V ci W[κi−1,κ]W[κ,κi−2]x1x2 · · ·xi−1xixi+1 · · ·xn
= −V c1 x1x2 · · ·xn.
Hence, we have
V ci W[κi−1,κ]W[κ,κi−2] = sign(σ)V
c
1 = −V
c
1 .
Then, (24) follows from Proposition 7. ✷
Next, we consider another necessary condition: If G ∈ K[n;κ], then what
condition c1 should verify? An argument similar to the one used in Proposition
20 shows the following result.
Proposition 21. Consider G ∈ G[n;κ]. If G ∈ K[n;κ], then
V c1 δ
s
κ
[
Iκn−1 +W[κi−2,κ]W[κ,κi−3] ⊗ Iκn−i
]
= 0, (25)
where s = 1, · · · , κ; i = 3, · · · , n.
Proof. Assume σ ∈ Sn satisfies σ(1) = 1. Let σ = (2, i), i > 2. Then, we have
V c1 x1x2 · · ·xn
= −V c1 x1xix3 · · ·xi−1x2xi+1 · · ·xn
= −V c1 x1W[κi−2,κ]W[κ,κi−3]x2 · · ·xn, i = 3, 4, · · · , n.
Since x2 · · ·xn ∈ ∆κn−1 are arbitrary, we have
V c1 x1 = −V
c
1 x1W[κi−2,κ]W[κ,κi−3].
Setting x1 = δ
s
κ, we have (25). ✷
Note that the symmetric group Sn is generalized by transpositions {(1, i)}
[10]. That is,
Sn = 〈(1, i) | 1 < i ≤ n〉 .
This fact motivates the following result.
Theorem 22. Consider G ∈ G[n;κ].
(1) If n = 2, then (24) is the necessary and sufficient condition for G ∈ K[2;κ].
(2) If n > 2, then (24) and (25) are necessary and sufficient conditions for
G ∈ K[n;κ].
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Proof. We need only to prove the sufficiency.
(1) if n = 2, (22) implies the sufficiency.
(2) if n > 2, we divide our proof into two steps.
First, we prove the condition for a single payoff function ci. For any σ ∈ Sn
and σ(1) = 1, without loss of generality, we assume
σ := (2, i1)(2, i2) · · · (2, it) := σ1 ◦ σ2 ◦ · · · ◦ σt,
where σj = (2, ij), j = 1, 2, · · · , t.
From (25), it can be calculated that
V c1 x1x2 · · ·xn
= −V c1 x1xσ−1t (2)
· · ·xσ−1t (n)
= (−1)2V c1 x1xσ−1t (σ
−1
t−1(2))
· · ·xσ−1t (σ
−1
t−1(n))
...
= (−1)tV c1 x1xσ−1t (···(σ
−1
1 (2)))
· · ·xσ−1t (···(σ
−1
1 (n)))
= sgn(σ)V c1 x1xσ−1(1) · · ·xσ−1(n)
(26)
Applying (24) to (26), we have
V ci xix2 · · ·xi−1x1xi+1 · · ·xn
= sgn(σ)V ci xσ−1(i)xσ−1(2) · · ·xσ−1(i−1)x1xσ−1(i+1) · · ·xσ−1(n).
(27)
(27) implies that for any σ ∈ Sn and σ(i) = i, we have
ci(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi, xi+1, · · · , xn) = ci(xσ−1(1), · · · , xσ−1(i−1), xσ−1(i),
xσ−1(i+1), · · · , xσ−1(n)).
(28)
Obviously, according to (19), (28) is the necessary and sufficient condition for a
single payoff function to obey in a skew-symmetric game.
Next, we consider the condition for cross payoffs.
For any σ ∈ Sn, without loss of generality, we assume
σ := (1, i1)(1, i2) · · · (1, it) := σ1 · · ·σt,
where σj = (1, ij), j = 1, 2, · · · , t.
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Combining (24) with (25) yields
V ci x1 · · ·xi−1xixi+1 · · ·xn
= −V cσt(i)xσ−1t (1)
xσ−1t (2)
· · ·xσ−1t (n)
= (−1)2V cσt−1(σt(i))xσ−1t (σt−1(1))
· · ·xσ−1t (σt−1(n))
...
= (−1)tV cσ1(···(σt(i)))xσ−1t (···(σ
−1
1 (1)))
· · ·xσ−1t (···(σ
−1
1 (n)))
= sgn(σ)V cσ(i)xσ−1(1)xσ−1(2) · · ·xσ−1(n)
(29)
Clearly, (19) follows from (28) and (29). ✷
Remark 23. When n = 2 (24) degenerated
V c2 = −V
c
1W[κ,κ], (30)
which coincides with (22).
Example 24. Consider G ∈ K[3;3]. From Proposition 21 we have
V c1 δ
s
3
[
I32 +W[3,3]
]
= 0, s = 1, 2, 3.
One can easily figure out that
V c1 = [0, a1, a2,−a1, 0, a3,−a2,−a3, 0, 0, b1, b2,−b1, 0, b3,−b2,−b3, 0, 0, c1, c2,−c1, 0, c3,−c2,−c3, 0],
where ai, bi, ci, i = 1, 2, 3, are real numbers. According to Proposition 20, we
can calculate that
V c2 = [0,−a1,−a2, 0, 0,−b1,−b2,−c1,−c2, a1, 0,−a3, b1, 0,−b3, c1, 0,−c3, a2, a3, 0, b2, b3, 0, c2, c3, 0],
V c3 = [0, 0, 0, a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2,−a1,−b1,−c1, 0, 0, 0, a3, b3, c3,−a2,−b3,−c2,−a3,−b3,−c3, 0, 0, 0].
According to Definition 13, a straightforward verification shows that G ∈ K[3;3].
As a byproduct, we have dim(K[3;3]) = 9.
In the following, we consider the linear representation of Sn in G[n;κ].
Definition 25. [14] Let A be a group and V a finite dimensional vector space.
A linear representation of A in V is a group homomorphism ϕ : A→ GL(V ).
Consider a profile s = (i1, i2, · · · , in) of a G ∈ G[n;κ]. We define two expres-
sions of s as follows:
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• STP Form: The STP form of s is expressed as
s = ⋉nj=1δ
ij
κ .
• Stacking Form: The strategy stacking form of s is expressed as
~s =


δi1κ
δi2κ
...
δinκ

 .
Denote
Φ :=


Φ1
Φ2
...
Φn

 ,
where
Φi = 1
T
κi−1 ⊗ Ik ⊗ 1
T
κn−i , i = 1, · · · , n.
It is easy to verify that the Φ can convert a profile from its STP form to its
strategy stacking form. Precisely, we have
~s = Φs. (31)
Remark 26. In the pseudo-logical function expression of payoffs (1), the pro-
files are expressed in its STP form, while in Definition 13 to permute the strate-
gies the stacking form of s is convenient. That is why the above conversion is
necessary.
Using above notations and Definition 13, the following result can be obtained
easily.
Proposition 27. A game G ∈ G[n;κ] is skew-symmetric, if and only if,
V ci = sgn(σ)V
c
σ(i)Tσ, ∀σ ∈ Sn, i = 1, · · · , n, (32)
where Tσ = Φσ−1(1) ∗ Φσ−1(2) ∗ · · ·Φσ−1(n), and ∗ is the Khatri-Rao product.
We need the matrix expression of a σ ∈ Sn, denoted by Pσ. It is defined as
Coli(Pσ) = δ
j
n, if σ(i) = j, i = 1, · · · , n.
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Consequently, we have
Pσ = [δ
σ(1)
n , δ
σ(2)
n , · · · , δ
σ(n)
n ]. (33)
The next property follows immediately from the construction.
Proposition 28. Let σ ∈ Sn. Then σ(i) = j, if and only if,
Pσδ
i
n = δ
j
n.
Denote
V σG = [V
c
σ(1), V
c
σ(2), · · · , V
c
σ(n)] ∈ R
nκn .
Using Propositions 27 and 28, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 29. G ∈ G[n;κ] is skew-symmetric, if and only if,
VG = VG(Pσ ⊗ sgn(σ)Tσ), ∀σ ∈ Sn. (34)
Proof. (Necessity) From (32) we have
VG = [V
c
1 , V
c
2 , · · · , V
c
n ]
= [sgn(σ)V cσ(1)Tσ, sgn(σ)V
c
σ(2)Tσ, · · · , sgn(σ)V
c
σ(n)Tσ]
= [V cσ(1), V
c
σ(2), · · · , V
c
σ(n)][In ⊗ sgn(σ)Tσ]
= V σG [In ⊗ sgn(σ)Tσ]
= VGPσ[In ⊗ sgn(σ)Tσ]
= VG[Pσ ⊗ sgn(σ)Tσ].
(Sufficiency) Splitting (34) into blocks, where each block corresponds to a
component V ci , a straightforward computation verifies (32) . ✷
Proposition 30. Define a mapping of σ ∈ Sn to the general linear group of
the vector space G ∈ G[n;κ] as
ψ(σ) := Pσ ⊗ sgn(σ)Tσ ∈ GL(G[n;κ]). (35)
Then, ψ is a linear representation of Sn in G[n;κ].
Proof. We need only to show that ψ is a group homomorphism, that is
ψ(µ ◦ σ) = ψ(µ)ψ(σ).
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First, we verify that
Pµ◦σ = PµPσ. (36)
Denote
Pn := {Pσ | σ ∈ Sn}.
Clearly, there is a one-one correspondence between Pn and Sn. Furthermore,
from (33) we can calculate that
Pµ◦σ = [δ
(µ◦σ)(1)
n , δ
(µ◦σ)(2)
n , · · · , δ
(µ◦σ)(n)
n ]
= [δ
µ(σ(1))
n , δ
µ(σ(2))
n , · · · , δ
µ(σ(n))
n ]
= Pµ[δ
σ(1)
n , δ
σ(2)
n , · · · , δ
σ(n)
n ]
= PµPσ.
Next, we prove that
Tµ◦σ = TµTσ. (37)
Define
σ(x) = ⋉ni=1xσ−1(i).
According to Proposition 12 and (31) we have
σ(x) = ⋉ni=1(Φσ−1(i)x)
= (Φσ−1(1)x)(Φσ−1(2)x) · · · (Φσ−1(n)x)
= (Φσ−1(1) ∗ Φσ−2(2) ∗ · · · ∗ Φσ−1(n))x
= Tσx.
Hence
Tµ◦σ(x) = (µ ◦ σ)(x) = µ(σ(x)) = µ(Tσx) = TµTσx.
Note that
sgn(µ ◦ σ) = sgn(µ)sgn(σ). (38)
Using (36), (37) and (38), a straightforward computation shows that
ψ(µ ◦ σ) := Pµ◦σ ⊗ sgn(µ ◦ σ)Tµ◦σ
= (PµPσ)⊗ [sgn(µ)sgn(σ)TµTσ]
= [Pµ ⊗ sgn(µ)Tµ][Pσ ⊗ sgn(σ)Tσ]
= ψ(µ)ψ(σ).
The proof is completed. ✷
Theorem 29 and Proposition 30 lead to the following result.
Corollary 31. G ∈ G[n;κ] is skew-symmetric, if and only if, it is invariant with
respect to the linear representation ψ(σ), ∀ σ ∈ Sn.
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4. Some Properties of K[n,κ]
In this section, we mainly discuss some properties of K[n,κ] via its structure
vector, which reveal the inside structure of skew-symmetric games. Particularly,
they will be used in the sequel for investigating the decomposition of finite
games.
4.1. Existence of K[n,κ]
The following proposition shows that when n > κ + 1 the K[n,κ] does not
exit.
Proposition 32. Consider G ∈ K[n;κ]. If n > κ+ 1, then
ci(x) = 0, ∀ x ∈ S, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (39)
Proof. Assume n > κ+1. It is easy to know that for each x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈
S, there exists at least two strategies xi, xj (i > 1 and j > 1), satisfying
xi = xj , i 6= j. (40)
Let σ = (i, j). Applying (40) to (19), we have
c1(x1, · · · , xi, · · · , xj , · · · , xn) = −c1(x1, · · · , xj , · · · , xi, · · · , xn) = 0.
Hence
V1 = 0.
Using (24), we have
Vi = 0, i = 2, 3, · · · , n.
The conclusion follows. ✷
Next, we consider the marginal case when n = κ+ 1.
Proposition 33. Consider G ∈ K[n;κ]. If n = κ + 1, then G is a zero-sum
game. That is,
n∑
i=1
cix = 0, ∀ x ∈ S.
Proof. Since n = κ + 1, for any x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ S, there exists at least
two strategies xi, xj satisfying xi = xj . Let σ = (i, j). From (19) it is easy to
verify that
cp(x) =


0, p 6= i, j;
−ci(x), p = j;
−cj(x), p = i.
(41)
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That is,
ci(x) = −cj(x).
Hence,
n∑
p=1
cp(x) =
∑
p6=i,j
cp(x) + ci(x) + cj(x)
= ci(x) + cj(x) = 0.
✷
4.2. The Basis of K[n;κ]
In this subsection we construct a basis for K[n;κ]. According to Proposition
32, we only need to consider the case when n ≤ κ+1. Otherwise, K[n;κ] = {0}.
Moreover, according to Proposition 20, to get a basis of K[n;κ], it is enough
to find a basis for V c1 .
Algorithm 1:
Define
O = {s−1 = z = (z1, · · · , zn−1)
∣∣ z1 < z2 · · · < zn−1, zj ∈ Sj+1} ,
where s−1 ∈ S−1.
It is easy to see |O| = ℓ, where
ℓ =
(
κ
n− 1
)
=
κ!
(n− 1)!(κ− n+ 1)!
. (42)
Define a relation ≺ on the set O as follows:
(z11 , z
1
2 , · · · , z
1
n−1) ≺ (z
2
1 , z
2
2 , · · · , z
2
n−1), (43)
if and only if, there exists 0 < j ≤ n− 2, such that
z
1
i = z
2
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ j
z1j+1 < z
2
j+1.
One sees easily that the relation ≺ is a strict order which makes O a well ordered
set as
O := (z1, z2, · · · , zℓ).
Now for each zi = (zi1, z
i
2, · · · , z
i
n−1), we define a set
Oi :=
{
ziσ =
(
ziσ(1), · · · , z
i
σ(n−1)
)
| σ ∈ Sn−1
}
. (44)
According to the definition of skew-symmetry and the above construction, the
following facts are either obvious or easily verifiable.
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Fact 1: If z 6∈
⋃ℓ
i=1Oi, then for any x1 ∈ S1, c1(x1, z) = 0, because at least two
components of z are the same.
Fact 2:
c1(x1, z
i
σ) = sign(σ)c1(x1, z
i), x1 ∈ S1; (45)
Fact 3:
Oi
⋂
Oj = ∅, i 6= j.
Now, it is clear that to construct the basis for V c1 , we need only to construct
a “dual basis” for each Oi. Note that x1 ∈ S1 is free, then we can define(
ηij
)T
:= δjκ
∑
σ∈Sn−1
sign(σ)δ
ziσ(1)
κ δ
ziσ(2)
κ · · · δ
ziσ(n−1)
κ , (46)
where j = 1, · · · , κ, ; i = 1, · · · , ℓ.
Summarizing the above construction and argument yields the following re-
sults.
Lemma 34. Consider G ∈ K[n;κ]. Define
B =


η11
·
η1κ
...
ηℓ1
·
ηℓκ


, (47)
where ηij, j = 1, · · · , κ, i = 1, · · · , ℓ, are defined in (46). Then, there exists a
row vector v ∈ Rκℓ, such that
V c1 = vB.
Lemma 35.
〈
ηi1j1 , η
i2
j2
〉
=

 0, (i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2);(n− 1)!, (i1, j1) = (i2, j2),
where 1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ ℓ, 1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ κ.
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According to Lemmas 34 and 35, one sees that Row(B) is an orthonormal
basis of V c1 . Furthermore, Using Proposition 20, we have the following result:
Theorem 36. The basis of K[n;κ] is Row(D), where
D =
[
B,−BW[κ0,κ]W[κ,κ],−BW[κ1,κ]W[κ,κ2], · · · ,−BW[κn−2,κ]W[κ,κn−1]
]
.
(48)
Corollary 37.
dim
(
K[n;κ]
)
= κℓ := β. (49)
Recall Examples 15 and 24, where the dimensions of K[3;2] and K[3;3] have been
proved to be 2 and 9 respectively. Both two dimensions verify the formula (49).
Proposition 38. Define
di = Rowi(D), i = 1, · · · , β.
Then we have
〈di, dj〉 =

 0, i 6= j;n!, i = j. (50)
Proof. Denote
Cm =W[κm−2,κ]W[κ,κm−1], m = 2, 3, · · · , n.
From Theorem 36 we know
ds = Rows(Φ)
= [Rows(B), Rows(−BC2), · · · , Rows(−BCn)].
According to Proposition 7, it is easy to calculate that
〈di, dj〉 = didTj
= Rowi(B)Row
T
j (B) +
n∑
m=2
Rowi(−BCm)RowTj (−BCm)
= Rowi(B)Row
T
j (B) +
n∑
m=2
Rowi(−B)CmCTmRow
T
j (−B)
= nRowi(B)Row
T
j (B).
(50) follows from Lemma 35. ✷
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5. Orthogonality of K[n;κ] with S[n;κ]
5.1. Basis of S[n;κ]
Theorem 39. [9] Consider G ∈ S[n;κ]. Then
dim(S[n;κ]) = κp := α, (51)
where p :=
(
n+κ−2
n−1
)
= (n+κ−2)!(n−1)!(κ−1)! .
Theorem 40. [9] G ∈ G[n;κ] is a symmetric game, if and only if,
(1) V c1
[
Iκ ⊗
(
W[κs−2,κ]W[κ,κs−1]
)
− Iks+1
]
= 0, s = 2, 3, · · · , n− 1.
(2) V ci = V
c
1W[κi−1,κ], i = 2, 3, · · · , n.
For symmetric games, similar to Algorithm 1, we give an algorithm to construct
a basis for V c1 .
Algorithm 2:
Define
Q = {s−1 = z = (z1, · · · , zn−1)
∣∣ z1 ≤ z2 · · · ≤ zn−1, zj ∈ Sj+1} .
Applying the relation ≺ defined in (43) to Q, it also makes Q a well ordered set
as
Q := (z1, z2, · · · , zp).
Now for each zi = (zi1, z
i
2, · · · , z
i
n−1), we define a set
Qi :=
{
ziσ =
(
ziσ(1), z
i
σ(2), · · · , z
i
σ(n−1)
)
| σ ∈ Sn−1
}
:= {zi,1 < zi,2 < · · · < zi,qi}, (52)
where qi is the number of different z
i
σ in Qi. Denote the number of j in z
i as
#i(j), j = 1, · · · , κ, i = 1, · · · , p. Then we have
qi =
κ!∏κ
j=1(#i(j))!
, i = 1, · · · , p. (53)
Moreover, they also satisfy that
p∑
i=1
qi = κ
n−1. (54)
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Define (
ζij
)T
:= δjκ
qi∑
t=1
δ
zi,t1
κ δ
zi,t2
κ · · · δ
zi,t
n−1
κ . (55)
Summarizing the above construction and the argument, we can obtain the fol-
lowing lemmas.
Lemma 41. Consider G ∈ S[n;κ]. Define
H =


ζ11
·
ζ1κ
...
ζ
p
1
·
ζpκ


, (56)
where ζij, j = 1, · · · , κ, i = 1, · · · , p, are defined in (55). Then, there exists a
row vector v ∈ Rα, such that
V c1 = vH.
Lemma 42. 〈
ζi1j1 , ζ
i2
j2
〉
=

 0, (i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2);qi, (i1, j1) = (i2, j2),
where 1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ p, 1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ κ.
According to Lemmas 41, 42, and Theorem 40, we have the following result:
Theorem 43. (1) The basis of S[n;κ] is Row(E), where
E =
[
H,HW[κ,κ], · · · , HW[κn−1,κ]
]
. (57)
(2) Define
ei = Rowi(E), i = 1, · · · , α.
Then we have
〈ei, ej〉 =

 0, i 6= j;nqi, i = j. (58)
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5.2. Orthogonality Between Symmetric and Skew-Symmetric Subspaces
Putting the two basis-set matrices D and E together, we construct a new
basis-set matrix Q as follows:
Q =
[
D
E
]
. (59)
We will prove that Q is of full row rank. It is enough to prove the following
proposition, which shows that S[n;κ] and K[n;κ] are two orthogonal subspaces.
Proposition 44.
〈di, ej〉 = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , β, j = 1, 2, · · · , α. (60)
Proof. To prove this proposition, it is enough to verify the following result: for
η
j
t and ζ
i
s constructed by using Oj and Qi respectively, we have
η
j
t (ζ
i
s)
T = 0, (61)
where t, s = 1, 2, · · · , κ; j = 1, 2, · · · , ℓ; i = 1, 2, · · · , p.
According to the construction of Oj and Qi, it can be found that for each
Oj , there exists unique Qi(j), such that
zj = zi(j), Oj = Qi(j). (62)
In this case, from (46) and (55) we have
(
η
j
t
)T
:= δtκ
∑
σ∈Sn−1
sign(σ)δ
zj
σ(1)
κ δ
zj
σ(2)
κ · · · δ
zj
σ(n−1)
κ ,(
ζ
i(j)
s
)T
:= δsκ
∑
σ∈Sn−1
δ
z
i(j)
σ(1)
κ δ
z
i(j)
σ(2)
κ · · · δ
z
i(j)
σ(n−1)
κ ,
where t, s = 1, 2, · · · , κ.
Note that
|{σ ∈ Sn−1|σ is odd permutation}| = |{σ ∈ Sn−1|σ is even permutation}| =
(n−1)!
2 .
Then, it is easy to calculate that
η
j
t (ζ
i(j)
s )T = 0, t, s = 1, 2, · · · , κ, j = 1, 2, · · · , ℓ. (63)
Next, for i 6= i(j), we have Oj ∩ Qi = ∅, it is easy to see that
η
j
t (ζ
i
s)
T = 0, 1 ≤ t, s ≤ κ. (64)
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In fact, the location of nonzero elements, i.e., “1” and “-1,” in ηjt is different
from that in ζis. Hence (64) holds. (63) and (64) imply (61), which proves (60).
✷
According to Proposition 38, Theorem 43 and Proposition 44, the following
result can be obtained.
Proposition 45. Q has full row rank. That is,
dim(Q) = β + α.
Summarizing Proposition 32 and Proposition 45 yields the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 46. 1. if n > κ+ 1, then
G[n;κ] = S[n;κ] ⊕ E[n;κ]; (65)
2. if n ≤ κ+ 1, then
G[n;κ] = S[n;κ] ⊕K[n;κ] ⊕ E[n;κ]. (66)
6. Decomposition of a Finite Game
Given G ∈ G[n;κ], we would like to decompose it into three subgames: GS ∈
S[n;κ], GK ∈ K[n;κ] and GE ∈ E[n;κ]. Precisely, we want to decompose the
structure vector of G, that is VG, into three parts as
VG = V
S
G + V
K
G + V
E
G , (67)
where V SG , V
K
G , and V
E
G are the structure vectors of GS , GK , and GE respec-
tively.
Now set
X = (X1, X2), (68)
where X1 ∈ Rβ , X2 ∈ Rα (when n > κ+ 1 we have β = 0).
Then we have the following decomposition:
Proposition 47. Assume G ∈ G[n;κ] with its structure vector VG. Then
VG = V
S
G ⊕ V
K
G ⊕ V
E
G ,
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where
X = VGQ
T(QQT)−1,
V KG = X1D,
V SG = X2E,
V EG = VG − V
S
G − V
E
G ,
(69)
and Xi, i = 1, 2, are defined in (68), Q is defined in (59).
Proof. From Theorem 36 and Theorem 43 we have
V KG = X1D, V
S
G = X2E. (70)
Putting (70) into (67) yields
VG = V
K
G + V
S
G + V
E
G
= X1D +X2E + V
E
G
= XQ+ V EG .
(71)
According to Proposition 45 and Definition 20, we know thatQQT is nonsingular
and
V EG Q
T = 0. (72)
Applying (72) with (71), it can be calculated that
X = VGQ
T(QQT)−1.
The conclusion follows. ✷
7. An Illustrative Example
This section provides an example to demonstrate the overall symmetry-based
decomposition process of a finite game.
Example 48. Consider G[3;2]. The bases of K[3;2] and S[3;2] are constructed
respectively as follows:
(1) K[3;2]:
It is easy to calculate that ℓ = 1 and
O1 := {O11 = {z
1
σ | sign(σ) = 1} = {z
1,1 = (12)},
O21 = {z
1
σ | sign(σ) = −1} = {z
1,2 = (21)}}.
(73)
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Using (46), we calculate that
BT1 :=
∑
σ∈S2
sign(σ)δ
z1σ(1)
κ δ
z1σ(2)
κ δ
z1σ(3)
κ = δ12δ
2
2 − δ
2
2δ
1
2
Then
η11 = B1(δ
1
2)
T , η12 = B1(δ
2
2)
T .
Finally, we have
B =

B1 0T4
0T4 B1

 =

0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0

 . (74)
Using (48), the basis of K[3;2] is obtained.
(2) S[3;2]:
It can be calculated that p = 3 and
Q1 := {z1,1 = (11)};
Q2 := {z2,1 = (12), z2,2 = (21)};
Q3 := {z3,1 = (22)}.
Correspondingly, we have
q1 = 1, q2 = 2, q3 = 1.
According to each Qi, we can calculate ζi using (55). To calculate ζ1 we
have
HT1 :=
q1∑
t=1
δ
z1,t1
2 δ
z1,t2
2 = δ
1
2δ
1
2 = δ
1
4 .
Then
ζ1 =

ζ11
ζ12

 =

(δ12)TH1
(δ22)
TH1

 =

H1 0T4
0T4 H1

 .
Similarly, we have
ζi =

Hi 0T4
0T4 Hi

 , i = 2, 3,
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where
HTi :=
qi∑
t=1
δ
zi,t1
2 δ
zi,t2
2
are calculated as follows:
HT2 := δ
1
2δ
2
2 + δ
2
2δ
1
2 = δ
2
4 + δ
3
4 ,
HT3 := δ
2
2δ
2
2 = δ
1
4 .
Putting ζi, i = 1, 2, 3 together, we have
H =


ζ1
ζ2
ζ3

 =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


. (75)
Using (57), the basis of S[3;2] is obtained.
(3) A Numerical Example:
Assume G ∈ G[3;2] with V
c
1 = δ
3
8, V
c
2 = δ
6
8, V
c
3 = δ
7
8 . Now we give the
orthogonal decomposition of G into GK , GS, and GE . The basis of S[3,2],
K[3,2] and E[3,2] is respectively as below:
E = [H,HW[2,2], HW[4,2]],
D = [B,−BW[2,2],−BW[2,2]W[2,4]],
and α = 6, β = 2.
According to Proposition 47, we can calculate that
X1 = [−0.1667, 0] ∈ R
2;
X2 = [0, 0, 0.1667, 0, 0.6667, 0] ∈ R6;
and
VG = [(δ
3
8)
T , (δ68)
T , (δ78)
T ]
= V KG + V
S
G + V
E
G ,
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where
V KG = X1D
= [0,−0.1667, 0.1667, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.1667, 0, 0,−0.1667, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−0.1667, 0, 0.1667, 0, 0, 0],
V SG = X2E
= [0, 0.1667, 0.6667, 0, 0, 0,−0.1667, 0, 0,−0.3333, 0, 0, 0, 0.3333, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−0.3333, 0, 0.3333, 0],
V EG = VG − V
K
G − V
S
G
= [0, 0, 0.6666,−0.6666, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−0.3333, 0, 0, 0, 0.3333, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−0.3333, 0, 0.3333, 0].
The corresponding payoff matrices are in Table 7-Table 9 respectively.
Comparing Tables 7, 8 with Example 15, it is obvious that GS is sym-
metric and GK is skew-symmetric.
Table 7: Payoff matrix of GS :
c\a 111 112 121 122 211 212 221 222
c1 0 0.1667 0.1667 0.6667 0 0 0 0
c2 0 0.1667 0 0 0.1667 0.6667 0 0
c3 0 0 0.1667 0 0.1667 0 0.6667 0
Table 8: Payoff matrix of GK :
c\a 111 112 121 122 211 212 221 222
c1 0 -0.1667 0.1667 0 0 0 0 0
c2 0 0.1667 0 0 -0.1667 0 0 0
c3 0 0 -0.1667 0 0.1667 0 0 0
Table 9: Payoff matrix of GE :
c\a 111 112 121 122 211 212 221 222
c1 0 0 0.6666 -0.6667 0 0 0 0
c2 0 -0.3334 0 0 0 0.3333 0 0
c3 0 0 0 0 -0.3334 0 0.3333 0
8. Conclusion
Skew-symmetric games are proposed and studied in this paper. First, for
two player games, it is proved that the vector subspace of SSGs is the orthog-
onal complement of the subspace of symmetric games. Second, a necessary
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and sufficient condition is obtained to verify whether a finite game is skew-
symmetric. Moreover, its linear representation is constructed to provide a con-
venient method for the verification. Third, two properties of K[n;κ] are obtained.
One is the existence of K[n;κ]. It is shown that: (i) if n > κ+1, then K[n;κ] = {0};
(ii) if n = κ + 1, then G ∈ K[n;κ] is a zero-sum game. In addition, a basis of
K[n;κ] is constructed, which plays an important role in the decomposition of
finite games. Then a basis of S[n;κ] is also given and the orthogonality of K[n;κ]
with S[n;κ] is proved. Finally, the orthogonal decomposition of a finite game
into symmetric, skew-symmetric and asymmetric subspaces is investigated. A
decomposition formula is given and an illustrative example is presented.
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